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The issue of procedural due process is examined in this article by first analyz-
ing the associated legal requirements of P.L. 94-142 and then identifying the "trig-
gers" which professionals and parents can use to initiate a due process hearing. 
Problems and unresolved issues associated with interpreting and applying due pro-
cess safeguards in terms of initiating, conducting, and governing the hearing and 
hearing officer are discussed. The concluding section of the article identifies 
specific training implications and creeds of due process hearing officers. 
Procedural due process rests on a fundamental notion of fairness: 
that is, the citizen has a right to protest before the government takes any 
action that may adversely affect him. In the case of the handicapped 
child, the right is to protest actions of the state education agency (SEA) or 
the local education agency (LEA). Without a right to challenge the 
school's potentially discriminatory practices, children would find that 
their substantive right to receive a free appropriate education would be 
depressingly empty. 
Procedural due process is also a constitutional requirement under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which forbid the 
government to deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. As applied to the education of handicapped children, 
this means that no handicapped child can be deprived of an education 
(the means for acquiring property as well as life and liberty in the sense of 
self-development) without being entitled to exercise his right to protest 
what happens to him. 
The success of the right-to-education laws reflects a belief common-
ly held by lawyers and educators alike: fair procedures will tend to pro-
duce acceptable, correct, and fair results. 
The purpose of this paper is (a) to examine the legal requirements, in-
cluding the ambiguous ones, of due process as set forth in PL 94-142, 
identifying the triggers that professionals or parents may pull to force 
each other to comply with the law by initiating a due process hearing, 
and (b) to highlight the training implications of due process procedures 
for various affected people, particularly hearing officers 
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Legal Requirements 
There are five major components of the due process requirements of 
PL 94-142. These are 
1. due process hearings 
2. independent educational evaluations 
3. written notice to parents 
4. parental consent 
5. surrogate parents 
Each of these components will be discussed separately. 
Due Process Hearings 
It is a common misconception of procedural due process under PL 
94-142 that only parents or guardians of handicapped children may in-
itiate a due process hearing against the child's local education agency 
(LEA). In fact, however, the LEA itself is empowered to call for due pro-
cess hearings. It is convenient to deal first with the parents' rights and 
then the LEA's. 
The LEA must give the parents, guardian, or surrogate of a handi-
capped child an opportunity to present complaints relating to any matter 
concerning the child's identification, evaluation, or placement or his 
right to a free, appropriate public education (Sec. 615(b) (1) |E) ) l . A 
parent or guardian who files a complaint with an LEA is entitled to an op-
portunity for an impartial hearing. The LEA must inform the parents 
about any available low-cost or free legal aid in the geographical area (Sec. 
121a.506 of the regulations). 
As noted above, the right to a due process hearing is not limited to 
the child's parents or other representatives. Under Sec. 121a.504 and 
Sec. 121a.506, an LEA may also initiate a due process hearing on its pro-
posal or refusal to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or 
placement of a handicapped child or the free, appropriate public educa-
tion provided to him. For example, a classroom teacher who suspects that 
a child is handicapped may refer him to the LEA's special services com-
mittee for a multidisciplinary evaluation. The parent, however, must 
give consent when a child is being evaluated for initial placement in a 
special education program. If parents refuse to consent to evaluation, and 
the LEA's staff believes that an evaluation should be obtained, the LEA 
may initiate a due process hearing to challenge the parents' decision to 
withhold consent to a multidisciplinary evaluation. Thus, due process 
hearings allow all parties involved — parents and professionals — to hold 
each other accountable. 
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Once a complaint is presented, the public agency must appoint an 
impartial hearing officer to conduct the hearing. The officer may not be 
an employee of the agency and may not have any personal or professional 
interest that would conflict with his objectivity (Sec. 121a.507). Aperson 
who otherwise qualifies to conduct a hearing is not considered an 
employee of the agency solely because he is paid by the agency to serve as 
a hearing officer. The local school board and employees of the state 
school board are not impartial hearing officers under PL 94-142 (Com-
pochiaio v. Califano [Civ. No. H-78-64, D. Conn., May 18, 1978]). 
At the hearing, both parties may be advised by counsel or by experts 
in the education of handicapped students; present evidence, examine and 
cross-examine witnesses; subpoena witnesses and documents; make 
arguments; receive a written or electronic verbatim of the hearing; and 
receive a written account of the hearing officer's findings of fact. 
An appeal from the initial decision to the state agency and then to 
state or federal district court may be taken by the child's representatives, 
by the LEA, or by any other aggrieved party. 
A K l u I m n t 0 s e c t i o n s o f P L 94-142 are cited in the text: e.g. (Sec 
615 JbJ |lj (EJ ). All such references to sections begin with a 6. References to the regulations implementing PL 94-142 are also cited: e.g. (Sec. 121a.506). All sec-tions of the regulations begin with 121. 
Independent Educational Evaluations 
d^elfj^6'5 °I ° t h e r r e P r e s « " a t i v e s are entitled to an in-
tESfiS < n o ^ n c y ) educational evaluation of the child. The law S t t l e l T C °T i S t S ° f "P r o c «iures used to determine edultL I' TdlCaPPCd a n d t h e n a t u r e a n d e x * n t of the special 
to he ,25 i r e k tf d S e rT 1 C e S t h a t t h e c h i l d n e e d * " The procedures are 
^ A< V Vth m i n d i v i d ^ a l child and exclude basic tests ad-
Hfl«« A ^ P r o c e d u r e s ^sed with all children in a school, grade, or 
class A qualified examiner not employed by the public agency responsi-
ble for educating the child is entitled to do the evaluation. A qualified 
person is one who has met certification, licensing, registration, or other 
such requirements of the SEA in the area in which he provides special 
education or related services (Sec. 121a. 12). 
LEAs must, upon request, tell parents where they may have indepen-
dent educational evaluations made. Under some circumstances, the 
evaluation is to be made at public expense, the LEA either paying the full 
, ?f M e v a ^ u a t l 0 n o r during that the evaluation is otherwise pro-
vided free to the parent. A parent has the right to a free, independent 
n forTl ^ D S ° f f i C C r r e « u e s t s o n e to use in a due process hear-ing or if the parent disagrees with the evaluation made by the public agen-
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cy. However, if the agency, in a hearing that it initiates, can prove that its 
evaluation was appropriate, the parent may be required to pay for the new 
evaluation. When a parent obtains an independent evaluation at his own 
expense, the agency must take it into consideration as a basis for pro-
viding the child with an appropriate education or as evidence in a due pro-
cess hearing, or both (sec. 121a.503J. 
Written Notice 
The LEA must give the child's parents or other representatives prior 
written notice whenever it proposes or refuses to initiate or change the 
child's identification, evaluation, or placement. The notice must include 
the following components (Sec. 121a.505): 
1. a full explanation of all the procedural safeguards available to the 
parents 
2. a description of the action proposed or refused by the agency, an ex-
planation of why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action, and 
a description of any options the agency considered and the reasons 
why those options were rejected 
3. a description of each evaluation procedure, test, record, or report the 
agency uses as a basis for the proposal or refusal 
4. a description of any other factors that are relevant to the agency's pro-
posal or refusal 
It also requires that the notice be 
1- written in language understandable to the general public 
2. provided in the native language of the parent or other mode of com-
munication used by the parent, unless it is clearly not feasible to do so 
If the native language or other mode of communication of the parent is 
not a written language, the SEA and LEA must take steps to insure 
1. that the notice is translated orally or by other means to the parent in 
his or her native language or other mode of communication 
2. that the parent understands the content of the notice 
3. that there is written evidence that the requirements (of oral transla-
tion and the parent's understanding) have been met 
Parental Consent 
Parental consent must be granted voluntarily and in writing before 
an agency conducts the preplacement evaluation of the handicapped 
child or initially places a child in a program that provides special educa-
tion and related services (Sec. 121a.504). 
Consent, in this context and in all others, means that (a) the parent 
has been fully informed in his native language, or in another suitable 
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manner of communication, of all information relevant to the activity 
(such as evaluation) for which consent was sought; (b) the parent 
understands and agrees in writing that the activity may be carried out; (c) 
the consent describes the activity and lists the records (if any) that will be 
released and to whom,- and (d) the parent understands that he gives his 
consent voluntarily and may revoke it any any time. 
If a parent refuses to consent when his consent is required, the par-
ties must first attempt to resolve the conflict by complying with any ap-
plicable state law. If there is none, then the agency may initiate a due pro-
cess hearing. Should the hearing officer rule in favor of the agency, the 
parent's refusal will be overruled, and the agency may evaluate or place 
the child, notifying the parents of its actions so that they may appeal 
(Turnbull & Turnbull, 1978, p. 177). 
Parent Surrogates 
If a child's parents are unknown or unavailable, or if the child is a 
ward of the state, the LEA must appoint a surrogate to represent the child 
in all matters related to the provision of a free, appropriate public educa-
tion (Sec. 121a.514). The surrogate must have the skill to represent the 
child and may have no conflict of interest that would interfere with this 
capability. 
Triggers for a Due Process Hearing 
As stated previously, the due process safeguards of PL 94-142 extend 
significantly beyond the specific due process hearing. The hearing, 
however, is the primary device for insuring the fairness of decisions and 
the accountability of all parties. A key issue in effectively implementing 
the procedures for due process hearings is identifying the circumstances 
under which hearings may be initiated by parents and LEAs. 
One way of analyzing PL 94-142 and its accompanying regulations is 
in terms of the rights that handicapped children have in their dealings 
with the SEA and LEA and the concomitant duties that those agencies 
have to the children. The rights-duties analysis identifies the occasions 
when either a student or his representatives or an LEA may claim that his 
or its rights have been denied and that he or it is entitled to a due process 
hearing. The rights-duties analysis also clarifies the manner in which PL 
94:142 and its regulations work to insure that handicapped children and 
LEAs have both rights and duties. For example, five of the six major legal 
principles of PL 94-142 insure that certain procedures will occur: zero re-
ject assures that the child will be included in a free appropriate public 
educational program; nondiscriminatory evaluation assures that he will 
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be fairly assessed; appropriate education insures that he will be educated 
in an individualized and meaningful way; least restrictive placement 
assures that he will not be unjustifiably segregated; and parental partici-
pation insures that the parent will be given a voice in the child's educa-
tion. All these procedures involve both rights and duties. 
PL 94-142 addresses each of these five principles by setting out the 
procedure or process by which the LEA must educate a handicapped 
child. The law also states that if the agency does not comply with the re-
quired procedure or process, the child may have an opportunity to 
challenge the school by requesting a due process hearing. Likewise, if the 
child's parents do not conform to certain procedures or processes so that 
the LEA may educate the child in the manner the law requires, the agen-
cy itself may have an opportunity to challenge the parent by requesting a 
due process hearing. The specific triggers of due process — organized ac-
cording to the five principles of zero reject, nondiscriminatory evalua-
tion, individualized instruction, least restrictive environment, and 
parental participation — are presented below. Unless otherwise in-
dicated, the child's parents or other representatives may file a due process 
hearing with respect to all of the following triggers. 
Zero Reject 
1. Sec. 121a.300: SEA failure to insure compliance with dates-certain 
and ages-certain requirement 
2. Sec. 121a.302: SEA and LEA failure to comply with free residential 
placement requirement 
3. Sec. 121a.303: SEA and LEA failure to provide for proper functioning 
of hearing aids 
4. Sec. 121a.305: SEA and LEA failure to provide for program options, 
including art, music, home economics, and vocational education 
5. Sec. 121a.306: SEA and LEA failure to provide nonacademic services 
6. Sec. 121a.307: SEA and LEA failure to provide physical education 
7. Sec. 121a.320, 321, 323, and 324: SEA and LEA failure to comply 
with service priorities requirement 
8. Sec. 121a.401: SEA failure to insure that children placed by LEA in 
private schools (a) receive special education and related services and 
(b) have all the rights of handicapped children served by the public 
schools . « * » 9. Sec. 121a.403: If parents place the child in private school, SEA or LEA failure to provide services to the child accordmg to Sec. 121a 450- 460 but either the SEA or the LEA may initiate a due pro-
izia.Hou . * o u , uuu ci F L E A program or the ques-cess hearing on the appropriateness oi au y 6 
tion of financial responsibility 
46 B O S T O N UNIVERSITY 
10. Sec. 121a.451: If a child is in private school by parent placement, 
SEA failure to provide for the child's participation in federally funded 
programs (failure to assure special education or related services) or 
SEA failure to insure that LEAs comply with Sec. 121a.452-.460 
11. Sec. 121a.452, .453, and .455: LEA failure to (a) provide special 
education and related services to handicapped children in private 
school, (b) provide such children a genuine opportunity to participate 
in public programs, (c) provide them with special education and 
related services comparable in quality, scope, and participation to 
those for handicapped children in public programs, and (d) use funds 
consistent with requirements for nondiscrimination in public pro-
grams (per Sec. 121a.456, .457, .458, .459, and .460) 
Nondiscriminatory Evalutation 
1. Sec. 121a.530: SEA or LEA failure to select and administer testing and 
evaluation materials and procedures that are not racially or culturally 
discriminatory 
2. Sec. 121a.531: SEA or LEA failure to do individualized evaluation (per 
Sec. 121a.532) before initial placement 
3. Sec. 121a.532: SEA or LEA failure to comply with evaluation pro-
cedures before initial placement 
4. Sec. 12la.533: SEA or LEA failure to comply with placement pro-
cedures, including interpreting evaluations 
5. Sec. 121a.534: SEA or LEA failure to review the child's individualized 
education program (IEP) and perform reevaluation every three years or 
more often if warranted or requested by parent 
Individualized Education Programs 
1. Sec. 121a.341: SEA failure to provide for IEPs for handicapped 
children in private schools 
2. Sec. 121a.342: SEA or LEA failure to comply with deadline for IEP 
development (at the beginning of the school year) 
3. Sec. 121a.343: SEA or LEA failure to initiate the meeting, have the 
conference when required, or review the IEP annually 
4. Sec. 121a.344: SEA or LEA failure to have all required parties at the 
IEP meeting 
5. Sec. 121a.345: SEA or LEA failure to provide for parent's participation 
at the IEP meeting 
6. Sec. 121a.346: SEA or LEA failure to write an IEP with proper content 
7. Sec. 121a.347: SEA or LEA failure with respect to handicapped 
children in private school to initiate or conduct an IEP meeting, have 
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private school participation at the meeting, or review IEPs annually 
8. Sec. 121a.348: SEA or LEA failure with respect to children enrolled in 
both public and private schools to have an IEP meeting or have private 
school participation at the meeting 
9. Sec. 121a.349: SEA or LEA failure to provide special education and 
related services as required by the child's IEP 
Least Restrictive Environment 
1. Sec. 121a.550(b): SEA or LEA failure to comply with the LRE require-
ment 
2. Sec. 121a.551: SEA or LEA failure to insure a continuum of alter-
native placements, including separate education and resource or 
itinerant teachers 
3. Sec. 121a.552: SEA or LEA failure to make an annual determination 
of placement, based on the child's IEP, as close as possible to the 
child's home; make program alternatives available to the extent 
necessary to implement the child's IEP; place the child in the school 
he would attend if he were not handicapped, unless his IEP calls for a 
different placement; or consider any potential harmful effect of place-
ment on the child or the quality of services he needs 
4. Sec. 121a.553: SEA or LEA failure to provide or arrange for 
nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities in the LRE 
5- Sec. 121a.554: SEA failure to implement the LRE for handicapped 
children in public and private institutions (other than schools) 
Parent Participation 
!• Sec. 121a.561: SEA failure to notify parents concerning the adoption 
of the state plan and amendments and major identification, location, 
and evaluation activities 
2- Sec. 121a.562: SEA or LEA failure to grant parents access to records 
concerning their children, upon request, and before the IEP meeting or 
due process hearing at which the issue is the child's identification, 
evaluation, or placement, and to comply with the required elements 
of parent access 
3- Sec. 121a.563: SEA or LEA failure to keep record of parental access 
4- Sec. 121a.566: SEA or LEA failure to charge reasonable fees for copy-
ing of records (not excessively high fees) 
5- Sec. 121a.567, .568, .569, and .570: SEA or LEA failure to amend 
records at parent's request 
6- Sec. 121a.573: SEA or LEA failure to destroy information not needed 
to serve the child, at parent's request 
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INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE DUE PROCESS 
SAFEGUARDS 
When the senior author of this article was a member of the Pro-
cedural Safeguards Committee of the Regulation Input Conference that 
developed most of the concept papers and many of the draft regulations 
that became the foundation for the final regulations adopted by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare on August 23, 1977, he 
was struck by several facts that may help explain why the procedural 
safeguard's regulations are so difficult to interpret and apply and, thus, 
why training hearing officers and others is so important. 
First, the conference was broadly representative of many affected 
constituencies. These were regular educators, special educators, SEA and 
LEA administrators, advocates for handicapped children, advocates for 
children whether or not handicapped, university faculty from a wide 
range of disciplines (school and educational psychology, special educa-
tion, school administration, and law), teacher union representatives, 
private consultants, and others. Many delegates also came prepared to 
make a case for the regulations to set out one rule but not another. It was 
predictable that the final regulations would represent a sort of vegetable 
soup — a little of this, a little of that, and plenty of broth. 
Second, almost every racial or ethnic minority group was 
represented. So, too, were all geographic regions of the country. Thus, 
Anglo-Americans from the rural Midwest were grouped with Spanish-
Americans from the nation's most populous cities. Again, compromise 
was predictable. 
Finally, there were precious few attorneys, particularly in the group 
that drafted the procedural safeguards regulations. Although lawyers' 
concerns with procedures often complicate the regulatory process and 
impede the swift (as well as capricious) administration of statutes, those 
concerns nevertheless are particularly important when drafting regula-
tions that call for administrative or quasijudicial hearings such as the due 
process hearings under PL 94-142. 
It is regrettable, in retrospect, that there were not more attorneys in-
volved in drafting the due process regulations and that they and the 
Department's Office of General Counsel's and Office of Civil Rights' at-
torneys did not spell out in greater detail the elements of the due process 
hearing Although this failure may be explained and perhaps excused in 
light of who was invited to participate in the conference, the failure 
nevertheless is causing a great number of problems in understanding and 
applying the due process regulations. 
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Initiating the Hearing 
Is there a time when it is too late to file a hearing request? The act 
and the regulations contain no statute of limitations. 
Sec. 121a.506 provides that a parent or LEA may initiate a due pro-
cess hearing; but the regulation does not provide for a mechanism to in-
itiate the hearing. How may one be requested — orally or in writing? To 
whom should the request be addressed — the LEA's superintendent, 
school board chairman, or other person? And what should the recipient 
do with the request — notify the hearing officer or others, in writing or 
orally, and confirm to the petitioner that he has taken that action? 
Conducting the Hearing 
There are, as well, a host of questions concerning the hearing itself. 
What procedures should be followed? Which party presents its case first? 
Is there a right to make an opening statement? Is there a right of the peti-
tioner to make a reply to the other side's final statement? Is there even a 
right to a final statement? In short, how will the hearing officer conduct 
the hearing so that it will be orderly, time efficient, and informative? 
What rules of evidence apply? Those that federal or state courts in 
that jurisdiction follow? Or a more relaxed set of rules, one that allows for 
the admission of evidence and the examination of witnesses under rules 
that deviate from those of the ordinary civil or administrative hearing? 
Although counsel clearly is permitted to every party at the hearing, 
and counsel's role normally is understood by everybody in administrative 
or civil hearings (it is to advise, to present the client's case, to attack the 
other side's case, and to argue), it is not at all clear from the regulations 
what the role is of "individuals with special knowledge or training with 
respect to the problems of handicapped children." Is it to serve as expert 
witnesses? As advisers to counsel for the purposes of helping present the 
client's case and impeaching the evidence of the other side (especially the 
other side's expert witnesses)? To argue the case for the party if there is 
no counsel to do so? 
What about errors made by the hearing officer, such as accepting in-
admissible evidence (once one decides which rules of evidence, if any, ap-
ply), making prejudicial statements (those that indicate that the hearing 
officer has made up his mind before hearing the case), failing to allow a 
Party to present its whole case (even if part of it is redundant and 
cumulative of evidence he already has admitted), or seemingly assisting 
one party in presenting its case (as by questioning one party's witnesses 
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in a friendly manner but obviously cross-examining another party's 
witnesses)? Will the rule of 1 'harmless error" be applied by the SEA ap-
peal hearing officer? (The rule of harmless error prohibits a decision from 
being reversed or modified on appeal if the error did not or could not have 
had an impact on the decision.) 
Sec. 121a.508 of the regulations forbid evidence from being admitted 
if it has not been disclosed to one of the parties by the other at least five 
days before the hearing. What, then, constitutes disclosure — telling the 
other side who the witnesses are and what they will say and informing 
the other side which documents will be offered as evidence and what 
those documents contain? Or simply listing the witnesses and 
documents? Is the hearing officer, prior to the hearing, entitled to 
discover the evidence that each party proposes to use? Would that be 
potentially prejudicial? What should he do if one party discloses its case 
to him but the other does not and later objects to the prior disclosure? 
What if the other party does not know of the disclosure? 
Do the rules of trial discovery apply? The regulations are silent and 
imply that they do not. But the state may have an Administrative Pro-
cedures Act that authorizes discovery. What law applies if federal and 
state law are in conflict? 
Although the regulations (Sec. 121a.508) require the LEA to transmit 
the hearing officer's findings and decisions to the state advisory council 
on special education after deleting personally identifiable information, it 
is unclear under the regulations whether those records are accessible to 
the general public or even to the child's parents. 
The regulations have serious shortcomings with respect to another 
very important matter: the authority of the hearing officer to enter 
orders and enforce his decisions. While providing for a hearing, for an im-
partial hearing officer, and for decisional finality, they do not address the 
nature of the decision. 
For example, is the hearing officer restricted only to considering the 
issue as presented to him by the party filing the appeal? Take the case of a 
parent who seeks a hearing and then alleges that the LEA failed to per-
form a proper evaluation of his child, offering evidence that indicates in 
what respects the evaluation was improper, inadequate, or incorrect. 
Does the hearing officer decide only whether the evaluation was not prop-
er, adequate, or correct? Or does he particularize his findings, stating the 
deficiencies in detail? May he order the LEA to perform an evaluation that 
corrects the deficiencies, or may he order only a proper, adequate, or cor-
rect evaluation? What power does he have to enforce his decision (or deci-
sion plus recommendation in the form of a particularized decision)? 
Assume the LEA reevaluates the child without fully satisfying the hear-
ing officer's particularized findings (and recommendation). What power 
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does he have to prevent further inadequacies? Clearly, he has no statutory 
or regulatory enforcement power; he cannot resort to such familiar 
judicial remedies as injunctions, civil penalties for contempt, or assess-
ment of damages. 
The problem of defining the scope of the hearing officer's decision-
making and enforcement powers is aggravated in the case of the child's 
individual education plan, or IEP, which requires at least annual review 
(whereas evaluation is required only every three years), placement, and 
entitlement to "related services," both of which are likely to change 
from time to time as the child's condition and age change. 
It becomes even more important to have specific and enforceable 
orders when the issue is the appropriateness of the child's education. 
While PL 94-142 defines and guarantees an appropriate education, it does 
not guarantee that the child will receive the most appropriate education. 
Accordingly, a narrowly drawn finding of fact and decision by a hearing of-
ficer on the issue of appropriate education may serve little purpose except 
to instruct the parties that, on the evidence presented, the child is or is 
not receiving an appropriate education. Unless the hearing officer also 
enters a decision setting forth what appears to him to be an appropriate 
education, the LEA or the parents are likely to have subsequent hearings 
on the issue of appropriateness. 
Clearly, there is a potential for a truculent LEA to abide by a perhaps 
unenforceable decision by making only the barest defensible effort at 
compliance while simultaneously avoiding taking action to satisfy the 
spirit of the decision and forestall any future due process hearings by the 
same parent on similar or the same grounds. The LEA that chooses to 
take such an approach may find that it wears the parents down, sapping 
them of their will and ability (including economic and physical ability) to 
resist. On the other hand, it may encourage parents and child advocates 
to organize a well-financed wholesale attack. 
To forestall the costly, inefficient, and minimally productive 
repetitious hearings about the same child and his evaluation, IEP,^place-
dent, or appropriate education, it is useful for the parents and LEA to 
stipulate in advance of the hearing the issues, facts, and acceptable 
remedies and to inform the hearing officer thereof. Although the doctrine 
°f res judicata does not apply (to prevent the same issue involving tne 
same parties from being tried again), there will be a common sense ot 
estoppel - that is, the parties will be reluctant to bring up the same 
issues again and again. . . 
In addition to setting forth the facts regarding possible denial ot a 
child's legal rights, the party requesting the hearing may also seek par-
ticular and general relief. In his allegations, he would be well advised to 
^lege violations that cover the broadest provable grounds - for example. 
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PiODr ate 1 T d i a ^ e d and therefore, his IEP is inap. 
above h e i n , / reDt " e r r o n e o u s > * * d he is, by reason of all the 
t h . n 4 . ? / ? 1 C d a n / P P r ° P r i a t e education. In his prayers for relief, he 
Me tk other! S P l C l f i , C I d i e f f ° r 6 a c h C O m ^ a n d < t 0 b e o n < h e ^ e rant'ed in ^ ^ ^ ^ a b l e relief as may be appropriate and war-
d̂ v el A I 3 b r 0 a d " b a s e d c h a I 1 ^ g e and a petition for relief are 
all or ™ « ? T . ? a , S S U r C t h a t t h e h e a r i n S o f f icer hears and decides upon 
annrnnT,! S * r d ? V a n t i s s u e s s u ™ ™ d i n g the child's rights to a free, 
ffl?* education, thereby reducing the likelihood that there 
will be multiple hearings involving the same parties. 
Governing the Due Process Hearing Officer 
Two obvious due process safeguard issues surround the hearing of-
ncer himself. One concerns his impartiality and qualifications to serve, 
ine regulations (Sec. 121a.507) provide that the hearing officer shall be 
impartial: he may not be employed by the LEA or other agency involved 
m the education or care of the child, and he may not have a personal or 
professional interest that conflicts with his objectivity. 
It is a rather easy thing to prove partiality if the hearing officer is an 
employee of the agency. It is quite another to prove it if the party 
Deiieves that the hearing officer has conflicting personal or professional 
interests. And it is still another matter to attempt to avoid having a case 
neara by a hearing officer whose record of decisions indicates that he is 
pro-LEA or pro-student. (Like lawyers who practice regularly before civil 
or.criminal courts, parties in due process hearings will come to know 
wno the friendly hearing officers are, and they will legitimately seek to 
nave their cases heard by those officers and no others.) Finally, it is by no 
means clear what the regulations mean when they require an LEA or SEA 
to keep a list of hearing officers that includes a statement concerning the 
quaimcations of each of them. The term "qualifications" could refer 
solely to their being qualified by reason of being impartial. It also could 
mean that the hearing officer is professionally qualified by reason of pro-
ressional training and expertise, having attended training programs for 
oue process hearing officers, or other qualifying characteristics. 
The regulations clearly are deficient with respect to characterizing 
impartial and qualified hearing officers. They do not permit any party to 
me a motion or any more informal challenge to the impartiality or 
qualifications of the hearing officer; they do not say whether a hearing of-
ficer may refuse to hear a case or even remove himself from a case after it 
negins if he discovers that he may no longer be fairly said to have no per-
sonal or professional interest that would interfere with his impartiality; 
and they leave completely open the question of whether a party at the 
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hearing may appeal solely on the grounds that the hearing officer was not 
impartial or qualified. 
There are several good rules of thumb for selecting unbiased hearing 
officers: (a) the SEA or LEA might ask consumer organizations to 
nominate persons; (b) the SEA and LEA could give those organizations 
the right to approve or object to hearing officers; (c) hearing officers 
should be professionally unaffiliated with the agency involved in the due 
process hearing or with a consumer agency (for example, present or 
former school employees from one LEA should not serve as officers for 
LEA hearings although they may preside in hearings involving state or 
local mental health services or institutions in other jurisdictions); and (d) 
hearing officers should not reside or work in the jurisdiction involved in 
the hearing. These guidelines are designed to insure that, in general, the 
list of hearing officers will be prepared in a way that will eliminate the 
more obvious objections to impartiality. One procedure that might be 
even more effective is to direct the SEA and consumer organizations to 
the state or local bar association's young lawyers' section as a source for 
names of lawyers who could serve. In addition, labor arbitrators or other 
persons experienced in hearing procedures could be hired; the services of 
post-secondary education faculty could be enlisted; or distinguished local 
citizens could be asked to hear cases in jurisdictions where they have no 
professional or personal interests. Of course, the agency that appoints a 
hearing officer may always remove him from its approved list. 
A second issue concerning both the LEA and the hearing officer 
focuses on the regulation (Sec. 121a.512) that requires the LEA to insure 
that a final decision is reached in the hearing within forty-five days after 
the agency receives a request for a hearing. As noted above, it is unclear 
who is authorized to receive a request on an agency's behalf. Assume that 
the request is received by someone not in a position to call the hearing 
and that the person does not immediately notify the authorized person 
(whoever that might be, and arguably it could be the hearing officer 
himself or some other LEA employee). It is clear that there has already 
been an infringement of the forty-five-day rule. Assume further that the 
hearing officer hears the case on the thirtieth day after the request has 
been received (thereby allowing about three weeks for the parties to 
prepare their cases and comply with the five-day disclosure rule), but he 
does not render his decision within the next fifteen days, and neither par-
ty has requested and received an extension of the forty-five-day period. 
Must there then be a hearing on the extension of the period, or will a con-
ference of the parties suffice? Usually, hearing officers and judges may 
not act ex parte, that is, without giving both sides an opportunity to be 
heard. In addition, what can be done to require the hearing officer to com-
ply with the regulation? There are no procedures in the regulations that 
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enable any party to require a hearing officer to do his duty in a timely 
manner. Apparently, the only recourse with respect to such an officer is 
to remove him, the question then being whether he should be removed 
after hearing the case, in which event another hearing before another of-
ficer would be required, or after finally reaching his decision. And what 
happens to the child while the hearing officer dallies with the parties? 
In addition, because hearing officers usually have other obligations, 
LEAs and SEAs must pay careful attention to the problem of when to hold 
hearings and how to keep a backlog of cases from developing. Judicial ad-
ministration techniques that help process cases rapidly through the trial 
courts may be useful. These include regularly scheduled hearing dates, 
prehearing conferences between the parties and the hearing officer, easy 
access to school records and evaluations by LEA and consumer expert 
witnesses before hearings, prehearing stipulations of facts and issues of 
law, flexibility in granting a limited number of postponements, and the 
willingness of the parties to use affidavits in lieu of live testimony. 
Additional Issues 
There are other issues involving due process hearings that, for the 
purposes of this paper at least, do not bear as directly on the training of 
due process hearing officers and the adequacy of the regulations as the 
issues discussed above. They deal, for example, with the possibility that 
LEAs may keep a double set of records on the child: one that the parents 
and other monitoring agents have access to and another informal set for 
school use only. Likewise, they involve the right of a litigant in federal 
court to have access to records of all children in an LEA. Such a right has 
been granted in Mattie T. v. HoUaday (F. Supp., N.D., Miss., 1978), a 
class action against an LEA in which the court ordered that the plaintiffs 
may discover those records as long as the personally identifying informa-
tion in them is deleted. 
There are, as well, a host of issues concerning the suspension or ex-
pulsion of handicapped children. Does the federal law mean that an LEA 
may not suspend or expel handicapped children who violate student con-
duct regulations? If the effect or purpose of the suspension or expulsion is 
to change a student's placement (rather than doing so by IEP and place-
ment decisions), the school may be enjoined from suspending or expel-
ling the student until the placement decision is made in the ordinary 
course of complying with PL 94-142 {Stuart v. Nappi, 433 F. Supp. 1235 
[D. Conn., 1978), decision on order granting preliminary injunction, ac-
cord, Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School District, 454 F. 
Supp. 634 [S.D. Tex., 1978) ). Where the suspension or explusion has 
resulted in a child's being denied free, appropriate public education as 
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guaranteed by PL 94-142, two school districts have entered into consent 
agreements providing for the child to be readmitted or given compen-
satory education (in a community college) at the school's expense (Don-
nieR. v. Wood (No. 77-1360, D.S.C. , consent decree entered August 22, 
1977J and Lopez v. Salida School District (C.A. No. C-73078, Dist. Ct., 
Denver Cty., Colo., Jan. 20, 1978] ). Finally, emotionally disturbed 
children are claiming that they must be treated in the same way as men-
tally retarded children in due process hearings on issues of discipline (J. v. 
Klein [No. 77-2257, E.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1977] ). 
There are two obvious points to the foregoing discussion of the pro-
cedural safeguards. The first is that the federal regulations are inadequate 
in themselves to answer many of the questions that have been raised. 
Whether state education or administrative procedures laws furnish 
answers is hard to say at this time. 
The second is that there is no substitute for well-trained hearing of-
ficers. When thoroughly schooled on the procedures to be followed in the 
hearings, the substance of case law, the applicable federal and state 
statutes and regulations, the nature and organization of the LEA involved 
in the hearing, the general characteristics of various handicapping condi-
tions, and the general abilities of educators to respond to those disabili-
ties, hearing officers will be likely to make more informed and more cor-
rect (less reversible or objectionable) decisions with less deliberation. 
The implications of the due process regulations for training hearing of-
ficers is the subject of the next section. 
TRAINING IMPLICATIONS 
The full implementation of due process safeguards requires signifi-
cant new knowledge and the development of new skills by many affected 
people. They include LEA and SEA personnel, school board attorneys and 
members, parents of handicapped students, preservice educators, faculty 
in departments of education at colleges and universities, attorneys, and 
hearing officers. Their needs are likely to depend on the extent of their 
background knowledge about handicapped children and special education 
practices and law and on their future involvement in due process pro-
ceedings. Thus, training models need to be individually designed for the 
specific target audience that will receive the training. 
One of the most important audiences (in terms of assuring that due 
process hearings lead to fair decisions) consists of the hearing officers. It 
is noteworthy that the regulations for implementing PL 94-142 require 
only that the hearing officer be impartial, that is, that he be free from 
conflict of interest and that he not be an employee of the agency (Sec. 
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121a.507). There is no requirement that the hearing officer be knowl-
edgeable in legal proceedings or in educational issues associated with pro-
viding appropriate instruction to handicapped students. Thus, it is likely 
that a hearing officer could clearly meet the requirement of impartiality 
yet be ill prepared to execute his duties because he lacks important 
knowledge. 
Training Issues 
Three pertinent issues that must be resolved before training the hear-
ing officers include sponsorship, method of delivery, and cost. Since the 
SEA has the ultimate responsibility of insuring that officers are qualified, 
decisions pertaining to these issues should be made or orchestrated at the 
SEA level. 
Sponsorship. A variety of alternatives exists for sponsoring training 
of due process hearing officers. Frequently, the training is done by the 
SEA. In these instances, a potential conflict could exist since the officers 
are being prepared to hear grievances that could be filed against the SEA. 
An example of such a conflict was reported to the authors by a hearing of-
ficer trainee who attended an SEA-conducted training program. This of-
ficer reported that the simulated activities all involved decisions made in 
favor of the LEA or SEA and against the parent. The extent of this type of 
bias may be infrequent and certainly cannot be generalized to all LEAs; 
however, the potential conflict of interest on the part of the SEA in 
delivering training should not be overlooked. 
The SEA can contract with outside agencies and individuals to pro-
vide training. A necessary consideration is: What skills should a trainer 
possess in order to prepare hearing officers adequately to execute their 
responsibilities? Essentially, trainers need expertise in both the educa-
tion of handicapped students (in determining characteristics, evaluation, 
and program alternatives) and in legal requirements and procedures 
(PL 94-142, other applicable state law, state legislation, court cases, and 
trial advocacy and process). Because of this dual set of skills and 
knowledge, interdisciplinary training by both educators and lawyers is 
appropriate. Thus, the SEA might contract with universities that could 
combine the resources of schools of education and law to provide inter-
disciplinary training. Another possibility is to contract with private con-
sultants who combine expertise in both education and law. 
Method of Delivery. In considering the method of delivering training 
to hearing officers, issues such as timing, location, and scope of training 
should be considered. In regard to timing, it is a common practice for 
states to provide training to hearing officers on an annual basis. Certain-
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ly SEAs and LEAs are well advised to have hearing officers appointed by 
the beginning of the school year, if at all possible. If training is provided 
on only one occasion each year, some already appointed hearing officers 
will undoubtedly be unable to attend because of scheduling conflicts. 
Also, if new hearing officers are appointed throughout the school year as 
a result or resignments of hearing officers or heavy case loads, they will 
have missed the training session and will have to wait until the next an-
nual program. SEAs might consider sponsoring two training sessions, one 
at the beginning of each school semester. Furthermore, packets of writ-
ten information and self-instructional materials could be developed and 
made available to hearing officers who are unable to attend training ses-
sions. 
Ideally, training should be an ongoing rather than an isolated event 
that occurs only at the beginning of a hearing officer's term of service. A 
preliminary knowledge base is essential; however, it may be just as im-
portant for hearing officers to reconvene periodically to share their ex-
periences in actual hearings and to engage in problem-solving related to 
troublesome issues on which they have questions. These sessions can 
contribute to systematic planning in resolving knotty problems associ-
ated with due process procedures. 
The location of training is a practical consideration that could 
significantly influence the attendance at a training session. In large 
states, it is likely that training will need to be delivered on a regional 
basis in order to make it more convenient and thus more accessible to 
hearing officers. 
In regard to the scope of training, variation in training needs will ex-
ist in light of the hearing officer's professional background. Table 1, 
which is based on a survey of North Carolina hearing officers conducted 
by the authors, provides a breakdown of occupations of the hearing of-
ficers according to the percentage of the total group of officers that falls 
into each occupation. 
It is obvious that the lawyers as a group will have more expertise in 
iegal proceedings and the rights of parties (such as rules of evidence and 
trial procedures) than the officers with nonlegal backgrounds. On the 
other hand, the educators will likely have greater expertise in educational 
tteas, such as the characteristics of handicapped students and the 
organization of schools. Some hearing officers in miscellaneous occupa-
tions, such as the postmaster and the agricultural extension agent, may 
have a strong interest in the education of handicapped students and clear-
ly meet the criteria of impartiality; however, they may need intensive 
training in all areas related to due process and appropriate <<™ i' ^ 
dangerous, however, to make assumptions of individual 
education. It is 
needs based on 
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Table 1 
PERCENTAGE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
HEARING OFFICERS BY OCCUPATION 
Occupation Percent of Total Group 
Lawyers 31.8 
Retired Educators (mostly superintendents and 
assistant superintendents) 34.1 
Special Services Directors 9.9 
College Professors 6.8 
Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents 4.5 
Other (housewife, postmaster, research 
microbiologist, attendance counselor, Navy 
officer, agricultural extension agent) 13.0 
occupational groups. In order to plan systematically the scope of training 
needed by hearing officers, an assessment of their training needs and pro-
fessional backgrounds should be made in advance. 
Cost. The third training issue to be considered is cost. The training 
of due process hearing officers is an expensive operation. In addition to 
paying for the time of trainers (especially if the SEA chooses to subcon-
tract with outside agencies or individuals), the travel and per diem sub-
sistence expenses and an honorarium represent additional costs and 
should be provided to the hearing officers in order to encourage them to 
attend training programs. Depending upon the professional status of the 
hearing officer, expectations for the amount of the honorarium will vary. 
For example, lawyers in private practice are likely to have a set rate per 
hour for their time,- on the other hand, hearing officers who are 
unemployed and thus do not have to take time away from work probably 
will not have an established honorarium fee. In the survey of North 
Carolina hearing officers, the question was posed as to what they be-
lieved to be fair compensation for serving as a hearing officer. The 
responses ranged from $50 per day to $100 per hour. The mean response 
was $32 per hour. Although this question was asked in regard to serving 
as a hearing officer and not specifically in regard to training, the expecta-
tions for compensation are still illuminating. Despite the fact that expec-
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 59 
tations will vary, the SEA would likely create more problems than it 
would solve by paying officers at different honorarium rates. Thus, a 
common rate needs to be established. If the SEA wants to encourage and 
support the participation of lawyers as due process hearing officers, the 
honorarium for training will need to be roughly competitive with then-
private practice rates. 
CONCLUSION 
Even those special educators and others most familiar with the pro-
cedural safeguards under PL 94-142 may have tended to assume that due 
process is a relatively simple matter. In fact, it is not. There are 
numerous events that may trigger a due process hearing, providing issues 
over which LEAs, SEAs, and other public agencies and parents may 
engage in battle. Moreover, the due process regulations are, for arguably 
sufficient reasons, hardly a model of procedural comprehensiveness and 
clarity. Finally, they can become unwieldy and universally hazardous 
when administered by untrained people. The content and logistics of the 
training are suggested by this article. But even more is suggested: name-
ly, that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare revise at least 
the due process hearing regulations before state practices and decisional 
precedents encumber them with inconsistent and potentially cumber-
some interpretations. 
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